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**PRESS ADVISORY**

No. 200-P  
September 21, 1994

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry will visit with U.S. Navy enlisted personnel in the Norfolk, Virginia, area on Thursday morning, September 22, 1994. Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) John Hagan will host the visit at Norfolk Naval Base and Norfolk Naval Air Station.

This event will not be open to the media. However, at the conclusion of his visit, the Secretary will conduct a brief media availability beginning at 12:45 p.m. at Norfolk Naval Air Station. The point of contact is Senior Chief Journalist Ted Brown at (804) 444-6887.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY  
REMARKS TO NAVAL ENLISTED PERSONNEL AT NORFOLK NAVAL AIR STATION  
NORFOLK, VA  
SEPTEMBER 22, 1994

Secretary Perry: I'd like to speak to some of our sailors here first, not to the press at this time.

It's a great pleasure to be down here in Norfolk, and have a chance to see some of the first class Navy operations in this area, and to meet some of the first class sailors we have down here. I came down this morning with the senior enlisted of our military forces--the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard. Each of them--in his own service--meets with you frequently to get a good understanding of what the needs of the enlisted personnel are. And I look to them as one of my primary sources of information about what I should be doing to try to make for a better quality of life, to make for a more effective force.

As part of that, we've formed something called the Senior Enlisted Council, in which the five of them--plus myself--form this council. We meet once a quarter, alternately at an Army base, Navy base, Air Force, and so on. This is the second such meeting we've had. And this one, of course, is at Norfolk.

This morning I was on board the TICONDEROGA, the USS SCRANTON, and the INCHON, which is a fairly representative sampling of the ships down here. I was received by the commander of each of these ships, but I spent nearly all of my time being hosted by the master chief of the ship and talking with the enlisted personnel on board the ship. It's been a very useful, very productive experience for me.

I would also say that, just before I started on this tour, I met with Admiral Paul David Miller, the commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Command, and also the commander-in-chief of all of our forces in Haiti. He had just returned from Haiti an hour or two earlier, and he gave me an up-to-date report on the status of our forces there, and his plans for the immediate future. I don't want to discuss that in any

great detail, except to say that this operation, which the President directed me to initiate back on September 10th, was ready for--in just nine days--a full-scale forcible entry of Haiti. And we were prepared to do that just after midnight, Sunday night. In fact, the first paratrooper was scheduled to land at 0001.

As you all know, we had an 11th hour agreement where the Haitian military regime agreed not to resist and to accept our forces peacefully. That agreement occurred so late that we actually had more than 60 aircraft already aloft--already heading towards Haiti--when we got the word. The paratroopers were on board ready to go, and it was not until after 8 o'clock Sunday evening that we were able to turn them around and send them back.

We were pleased that we did not have to shoot our way into Haiti. We were pleased we were able to spare the lives of the Haitians we would have had to shoot; and, also, that our own troops would not have to suffer casualties. But, the next morning, pursuant to that agreement, we began a peaceful entry into Haiti. And as of last night, we had 8,000 troops in Haiti. By the end of this week, we'll have more than 14,000 troops in Haiti. We will be a powerful military force and will dominate the activities on that island while we're there.

This force was intended from the beginning to be an overwhelming military force so there would be no issues--or questions come up--as to who had the superior power. But, it was also intended from the beginning, to carry out this mission with minimum casualties. So far, with 8,000 troops there, there's not been a single shot fired at an American.

It was, I think, a brilliantly conceived operation, and I think Admiral Miller and General Shelton get very great credit for the plan that they put together. Their plan, from the beginning, had two alternatives: either the forceful entry, or the peaceful entry. That was planned from the very beginning.

It was also an exercise of unequalled jointness, including a unique form of amphibious assault where we had 2,000 Rangers, and 30 Black Hawk helicopters, on board the EISENHOWER. I was on board the EISENHOWER last week, [and] talked with those soldiers and sailors. I was pleased to hear both the skipper of the EISENHOWER and the colonel in charge of the Army forces tell me this was going very, very well, and they thought this was a very effective plan.

We're going to have a difficult time ahead of us--between now and October 15th--because, while we had a peaceful entry, and that's the good news, the complicating factor is that the Haitian army is still there, still has a commander, and is still armed. And between now and the 15th, we have to effect a transition where we transfer over to a security situation, which will allow the legal government of Haiti to return. We believe we can do this peacefully, but we are

prepared to do it however we need to do it. That is, we have sufficient military force there that we will impose whatever needs to be done to succeed on this mission.

I have great pride--and the American public should have great pride--in the brilliance of the military plan that was put together, and the very great skill with which the logistics were assembled and deployed for this plan, with the superb commanders we have, and with the great professionalism and discipline of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force personnel executing this plan.

It was great to see you today. It's good to go out and look at one of your E-2s, and see the very impressive symbology on display. I have visited, and been on board the Air Force AWACS and the Army and Air Forces' Joint-STAR, which perform a similar function. But, unlike the Navy, they haven't learned how to perform that function in a small space. It's very impressive how much capability you have squeezed in that airplane--small enough to operate off a carrier. This is one of the most important capabilities we have in our modern Navy. Our Navy, as you all know, is organized around the most powerful ship in the world: the aircraft carrier. And the key to the success of that aircraft carrier is protecting it from attack from other airplanes. It has its own resident power capable of doing that, but it can only do it, successfully, when it has advanced warning and precise control. That's what your job is. You are key to the success of that operation.

God bless you, and it was good to meet you.

Q: General Cedras is now saying he has no plans on leaving. What is your reaction to that?

A: The agreement which we signed with the Haitian military regime does not require them to leave. I believe it would be far better if they did. And I believe, when it comes right down to it, they probably will. But, that is not a requirement which we have imposed on the regime.

Q: When you say, you "think" they will leave, is the U.S. going to force them out?

A: No, I said I "believe" they will. I believe they should, but we have not required them to do that, and we're not going to force them out.

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about the weapons collection that's going on today in Haiti-- the "buy-back" program?

A: We are in a very difficult phase--or a complex phase, right now--a transition phase between the military regime being in charge of Haiti and a new government taking over on October 15th. Part of that phase involves effecting a disarmament of the thousands of irregular military forces--militia, paramilitary--that are on the island and which are a potential source of violence--a very great difficulty. We will have several ways of effecting that. The most immediate way

will be an offer of a buy-back of weapons. In addition to that, there will be other programs as well, some of them carried out by the FAHD--the Haitian army--as they disarm their own militia, and some of them will be carried out by United States Military Police, as they establish weapon-free areas and gradually expand that to include more and more of the city. This is a process that will unfold over the next few weeks, but it will be converging towards the disarming of the factors that can cause violence--to facilitate a peaceful return of the legal government by October 15th.

Q: ...Bob Dole and some of the other Republicans have said, "the hard part isn't getting in, it's getting out." How hard is it going to be to get out, and when do you anticipate that the U.S. could get out?

A: Let me address the first part of that. Any of you, including any of the politicians who have opined about how easy it was to get in, were not involved in the detailed military planning that we executed as we were going through to carry out that operation. We had, as I said, a brilliant plan, and I believe it would have been superbly executed. It involved the application of overwhelming force. The reason for that is because we wanted a very quick and decisive military victory, and because, in our opinion, the overwhelming force would minimize casualties-- not only our own casualties, but minimize the casualties of the Haitians as well. However, we never envisioned it to be a piece of cake, we never envisioned it as an operation that would not involve casualties. Therefore, we are pleased that we did not have to conduct that first part of the operation. There is no military operation--facing resistance of perhaps 10,000 to 30,000 armed people--that could be described as "easy."

Nevertheless, because of the agreements made, we have entered peacefully. We now have 8,000 soldiers--last night we had 8,000. By the end of the day--today--we'll have about 11,000. By the end of the week, we'll have more than 14,000. That has gone very, very well to this point.

Once we have established a full military force, our first task will be establishing security on the island and creating conditions which will allow the legal government to come back. Once they have returned, we'll enter into a different phase, and that phase will be transitioning the security responsibility as quickly as possible to a newly structured Haitian army, and to a newly structured Haitian police force. I expect that when President Aristide arrives in Haiti, one of his first acts will be to name a commander-in-chief for the army--possibly even the first day--and a new commander of the police forces. A key to how quickly we can bring out our troops is how quickly the new police force comes on line. It's difficult to make a precise estimate of that but, I should point out, it will not be measured from October the 15th. We already have underway, actions to bring up that police force. We have recruited--and are beginning--the training of some of the Haitians on Guantanamo for the police force. We have assembled police monitors and police

trainers from a number of different nations, as well as our own. The process of training and preparing the police force is already underway.

I should think that the soonest we could expect to be out of there would be the end of the year--after the Haitian parliamentary elections are conducted. If we can get the police force up and operating, if we can oversee a fair and free election in Parliament which will be December of this year, then I think it's time to consider whether we can start pulling our forces out. I'm not predicting we'll be out that soon, but that would be the soonest we could reasonably expect to make a major drawdown in the force. After that, there's going to be a UN force come into the country, and perhaps 40 percent of that UN force will be American troops--and I expect we'll probably have an American commander. But, the military part of the operation has another few months to go, I believe.

Q: In these early days of our presence in Haiti, do you think U.S. soldiers on the ground have a clear idea of what their mission is? Do you see confusion among our troops there?

A: Yes, they have a clear idea. No, I do not see confusion. I see confusion in the media reporting what's going on down there. But I try to be as clear as I can about the two different missions, which are being executed simultaneously, which the reporting has confused.

We sent in there Monday morning, and again on Tuesday, a combat force. The purpose of that combat force was to seize control, to make it clear to the Haitian army that we were in control of the island. And that force went in of a sufficient size, and sufficiently armed, so they could defend themselves in the event the Haitian army did not honor their agreement.

In retrospect, they did honor their agreement, and we could have gone in with a different force mix. It would have been irresponsible to have put our troops' lives at stake by simply assuming there would be no resistance, so we went in assuming full resistance. Any of you who saw that first landing at the airport recognize that these are combat troops coming down--prepared for combat.

Once it was clear that we had established that objective, then we were able to bring in the next wave of troops, which are the Military Police. They started coming in the end of the second day, and came in force yesterday. We now have more than 1,000 Military Police on the island. It will be their job--not the job of our combat forces--to work, to oversee, and to monitor the Haitian police force to be sure that we have adequate control over the action of that police force.

In that interim period--after we put in the combat forces and before we put in our MPs--there was a malaise, on Tuesday, where the crowd was demonstrating and the Haitian police over-reacted, and abused the human rights of many of the

demonstrators. This is unacceptable as far as we're concerned, and we will not accept it. And we will take actions to prevent that. But, the resources we needed to take those actions were our Military Police force, which were not up and functioning at that time. We do not want our combat troops to get in the middle of a police function. That's not what they're there for.

As of today, as I said, we have more than 1,000 Military Police. We have had two very detailed discussions with General Cedras about the role our Military Police will play in overseeing and monitoring the function of the Haitian fleet--about the standards of conduct which we consider acceptable by the police. And I believe we will see a substantial improvement in that regard.

There's one other aspect of this problem. I'm talking now about relatively small scale police functions. If there should be a widespread outbreak--a complete general loss of control--the thousand Military Police are not sufficient to deal with, then our combat forces, including the company of Bradley fighting vehicles we have there, are available for a quick reaction backup force to support our Military Police. But, that's the only condition in which the combat troops are going to get involved. I draw that clear distinction because there's been a lot of confusion on that point.

Q: What kind of action can the Military Police take if dangerous, armed militia repeat what they were doing the other day? You said you could take action to stop them. What kind of action?

A: There's a full set of actions and plans we have underway--a little complicated to cover in a short press conference. Let me just cite a few of them, though. The most important action is preventive. That is, being clear to the Haitian police of what we consider sensible conduct, and we've already communicated that very clearly.

Secondly, is having our Military Police with the Haitian police at all levels, at every precinct. Third, establishing our Military Police at checkpoints. Fourth, having this quick reaction force to back them up, if needed. They are there--they're prepared to effect whatever action is necessary to be sure that the conduct is appropriate.

Q: What affect will operations in the Haiti area have on the budget? Will DoD receive any funds from other parts of the government to fund this?

A: When we figure the cost of an operation like this, it's a little confusing and misleading because we only calculate incremental costs--because our soldiers and sailors and ships and airplanes are already there. So, when we calculate the cost of the operation, it's the incremental costs--the extra fuel, the extra supplies needed to conduct this operation.

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For this operation, those incremental costs are about \$50 million for the first phase of it during the rest of this fiscal year. And, we estimate another, perhaps, \$200 million, on into the rest of the calendar year. That's much less than some of the other contingency operations we've conducted--for example, in Bosnia, Iraq, and Rwanda--because this is an operation close to home, and a lot of the expenses that are tied in are expenses for shipping things great distances. Nevertheless, that's roughly \$250 million not in our budget today. I have told the congressional leadership, and we met with them a few days ago, that we would ask for a supplemental appropriation--funding beyond the funding already in our budget to cover this, rather than take it out.

The immediate impact will be taking it out of the existing budget, because that's the only source available, but we will request supplemental appropriations to replenish the funds that were taken out for this operation.

Thank you very much.

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